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 Fertility Transition in China: Causes and Trends 
Peng Xizhe 
I. Fertility transition in China 
Historically, having sizeable families was considered as one of the major characteris-
tics of Chinese reproductive pattern. This was materialised by universal and early 
marriage. However, the natural fertility level in China was never so high as that 
recorded in the Hutterites population. According to historical studies, the TFR in 
the natural fertility regime was around 7–8 in Chinese society1.  
There had been some gradual changes in terms of the fertility desire and fertility 
behaviour, but the high fertility level was maintained in the first half of the 20th 
century. The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 ended the decade-
long war and brought about peace and social development, which resulted in very 
high fertility until the mid-1960s, though excluding the period of 1959–1961 when 
mismanagement and natural disaster caused massive excess mortality and very low 
fertility (Peng 1987). This demographic crisis alarmed Chinese leadership that the 
original optimistic view on China’s population needed some modifications and 
resulted in the introduction of birth control services in urban areas.  
China’s nation-wide fertility transition started in the early 1970s, initialised by 
the government-sponsored family planning programme. Total fertility rate declined 
sharply from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979, a dramatic decline in a very short time. 
While the government programme has played a crucial role in bringing down Chine-
se fertility, the fundamental changes that have taken place in China’s socio-econo-
mic structure since 1950 have also undermined the century-long reproductive 
norms and paved the way to fertility reduction.  
It is often assumed that once fertility transition has started, the momentum will 
maintain and fertility will inevitably reach replacement level (Cleland/Wilson 1987). 
However, China’s marked fertility reduction that occurred in the 1970s did not carry 
the same rapidity into the 1980s, despite government efforts in implementing the 
—————— 
 1  For example, see Zhongwei Zhao, ›Deliberate Birth Control Under a High-fertility Regime: Repro-
ductive Behavior in China before 1970‹, Population and Development Review, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 729–767, 
Dec. 1997. 
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much more rigid family planning regulation – the so-called »One-Child per Family« 
programme. The potential for fertility decline created by the socio-economic 
changes of 1950–70s seems to have exhausted by the 1980s, leading to a TFR fluc-
tuating between 2.3–2.9. 
Patterns of fertility transition in the 1980s indicated that China might have expe-
rienced two different kinds of fertility decline in these two decades. While the decline in 
the 1970s was mainly from high to low fertility, the 1980s witnessed a decline from low 
to near or even below replacement-level fertility. The two kinds of fertility decline 
should not be considered different merely in the numerical sense. It seems that the 
early transition is relatively easier and could proceed fast in a very short time period, but 
the later one is much more difficult and requires a somewhat more fundamental shift in 
the socio-economic conditions and the value system related to reproduction.  
The early 1990s witnessed another nation-wide downward trend of fertility, with 
the coastal ›opened-up‹ areas at the fore. This new wave of fertility decline certainly 
benefited from the economic reform and social changes generated by economic 
development. Moreover, the impact of the re-affirmed government commitment to 
population control should never be under-estimated. According to the official 
statistics, the TFR was reduced from 2.3 in 1990 to 2.0 in 1992, and has remained 
below replacement level since then.  
It has been a subject of controversy whether fertility in China was dropping as 
rapidly as indicated by the official statistics. Some demographers argued that the 
official birth statistics were subject to serious undercounting (Zeng 1995; Attane/ 
Sun 1999). The State Family Planning Commission might be the only government 
agency in China that openly admitted the problems in its statistics and tried to 
correct them. The commission has conducted annual random survey to double-
check the quality of population data and made great efforts to improve the accuracy 
of statistics over the last two decades. Results from these surveys varied widely bet-
ween provinces and regions. In areas like Shanghai and Jiangsu, it was reported that 
more than 99 per cent of the births were registered, while underreporting could 
mount to more than 20 per cent in some other rural locations2.  
The large-scale rural-urban migration is one of the causes that undermine the 
data-collecting system for fertility, as the current system is primarily based on the 
household registration and community administration. It is interesting to note that 
the total fertility rates of the 1990s that were derived from several national surveys, 
both conducted by the State Statistics Bureau and the State Family Planning Com-
mission, are consistently around 1.4–1.6 after adjustments, in spite of changes in the 
—————— 
 2  As these surveys were conducted in small scales, these data could not be used to represent the pro-
vincial features of birth reporting, or to infer to the national pattern.  
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sample selection and methods of field work3. Such a level is often in contradiction 
to the public view on fertility and family size. So far, there is not a single estimation 
of TFR that is widely accepted by the scholars. However, the publicised official 
figure, claiming TFR to be around 1.7–1.8, in my opinion and also commonly cited 
by researchers, is not far away from reality4.  
China launchs its family planning programme in the urban areas by providing 
contraceptive service in the early 1960s, immediately after the recovery from the 
national famine. Urban couples responded to the government call very positively. 
By the early 1970s, when the nation-wide family planning programme started, the 
fertility rate in urban China had already declined to around the replacement level. In 
other words, urban fertility transition is somewhat at least 10 years ahead of the 
rural one. While couples in China’s countryside are in general allowed to have two 
children, the one child policy has been rigorously implemented in the urban areas. 
The total fertility rate for China’s urban population as a whole averaged 1.1–1.2 at 
present. In some large cities, such as Shanghai, the TFR has remained below 1 for 
many years. 
 
Figure 1: Fertility Trend in China, 1950–2000 
 
(Source: Coale and Chen (1987: 24–9); Feeney et al (1993: 483, 486); Jiang et al (1995: 222–4)) 
—————— 
 3  These surveys include Fertility Survey conducted by the State Family Planning Commission in 1992, 
and 1 per cent National Population Sample Survey in 1995 etc. 
 4  In a Chinese Government Directive issued in March 2000, it is merely succinctly indicated that 
China’s fertility was below ›replacement level‹. See also Yu Xuejun/Xie Zhenming (2000) (eds.) 
China’s Population Development Review, pp. 41–43, Beijing.  
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There are always marked regional variations in fertility among China’s provincial 
units, but the gap has been narrowing in the recent years. Table 2 presents the des-
criptive statistics of provincial TFR in different decades of the second half of the 
20th century. It shows that while the means of provincial TFR has declined conti-
nuously through the years, the deviation from the national pattern increased at first 
and reached the peak in the 1970s, and declined thereafter. This phenomenon is 
clearly associated with the different path of fertility transition among China’s pro-
vincial units. While big municipalities began their fertility decline as early as in the 
early 1960s, fertility transition only started in the 1980s in some of the western pro-
vinces. Even with this regional variation, it seems clear that there has been a general 
trend of fertility convergence over time, which is evidenced by the decline of the 
fertility variance.  
 
 
Decades Means Variance Standard 
deviation 
1950s 6.176 0.323 0.568 
1960s 6.036 0.835 0.914 
1970s 3.876 1.751 1.323 
1980s 2.280 0.559 0.748 
1995 2.198 0.276 0.525 
1997–99 1.609 0.212 0.460 
 
Table 1: Statistics of TFR in various decades  
 
(Sources: Peng/Huang, 1993; Chen, 1995; Figure 3) 
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Figure 2: Provincial Fertility Pattern in China, 1997–1999, based on the estimation by China’s 
State Family Planning Commission (data for Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao are not included) 
 
(Source: Based on data collected from National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey conducted by China’s 
State Family Planning Commission in 20015) 
III. Major determinants of China’s fertility transition  
Given the characteristics of China’s fertility transition, several factors, the govern-
ment commitment and population programme, the socio-economic development, 
and reproductive culture, must be taken into consideration in any analysis of future 
fertility trends in China.  
—————— 
 5 Detailed information of the Survey can be found in Data Collection of 2001 National Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Survey, published by China Population Publishing House, 2004, Beijing. 
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1. The government commitment to population control  
China’s fertility transition is to a large extent facilitated and determined by govern-
ment intervention. China’s general population policy at present can be described as 
›Controlling population quantity, improving the quality of life, and making efforts to 
solve the aging problem‹. The family planning programme is the core of China’s 
national population programme, which is mainly managed by the State Population 
and the Family Planning Commission with support from other government 
agencies and various NGOs.  
The success of China’s birth control has been heavily dependent on government 
administrative intervention. The programme was initialised at the first instance by 
the central government and carried out through a top-down network. Since the late 
1980s, a target responsibility system has been gradually established. The system 
requires that heads of Party organisations and governments at all levels take the full 
responsibility for implementing the population programme through comprehensive 
management and co-operation between governmental departments and non-
governmental organisations, as well as between different development policies and 
programmes. It aims to ensure the accomplishment of population plans set up for 
each locality. Meanwhile, individual cadres‹ career development and position pro-
motion would be closely affected by their achievements in the family planning 
work.  
The basic principles of the current family planning programme are ›to promote 
late marriage and deferred childbearing, to encourage people to have fewer but heal-
thier births, to promote the practice of ›one child per couple‹ and to encourage a 
longer birth spacing for couples who have practical difficulties if they only have one 
child‹. This policy took a considerable amount of time to develop. In the 1970s, the 
focus was on later marriage and childbearing (Known as Later, Longer and Fewer), 
and has gradually shifted to the so-called ›one-child policy‹ since the early 1980s. 
Meanwhile, the intention for further improvement has never been ceased, even 
though the Government repeats the confirmation of ›keeping the family planning 
policy stable‹ each year. 
One of the salient features of China’s family planning programme is its decen-
tralised policy formation and operation. While the central government proposed the 
general guidance, it is the local governments, primarily the provincial governments 
but often down to the village levels, that are responsible for formulating and imple-
menting the programme. In other words, local authorities have been given some 
flexibility in adapting the national policy in order to accommodate the vast regional 
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differentials in social, economic and cultural conditions. As a result, the current 
family planning regulations can be grouped into some major categories6.  
 
Group Major Policy Regulations Coverage 
1 One child with very few 
exceptions in allowing 
couples to have two 
children 
All urban residents and rural couples in 6 
provincial units including Jiangsu and 
Sichuan (about 35% of total population) 
2 Two children if the first 
one is a girl 
Most rural couples in 19 provinces (about 
52% of total population) 
3 Two children with a four-
year spacing 
Most rural couples in 5 provinces (about 
9.6% of total population) 
4 Two or three children Minorities in the rural areas of minority 
autonomous regions 
5 No numerical regulation Rural Tibetan population 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Various Local Family Planning Regulations 
 
(Source: Author’s own classification, based on provincial family planning regulations that can be found at 
http://www.cpirc.org.cn) 
 
Gu Baochang and his colleagues provided a detailed study of this regional variation 
in fertility regulations, using mainly the term of policy fertility, which is a weighted 
average assuming reproductive behaviours of all couples in different locations and 
of different nationalities following the local government family planning regula-
tions7. It estimated that based on the term of policy fertility, about 63 per cent of 
Chinese families could end up with one child, while 36 per cent could have two 
children, and only 1 per cent could have more than two children. If all Chinese 
couples followed local family planning regulations, the total cohort fertility rate in 
China should be 1.62, but be 1.5 as more Chinese become urban residents. In spite 
—————— 
 6  Detailed discussion of the issue can be found in Xie Zhenming, ›Population Policy and the Family 
Planning Programme‹, in Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (eds.) (2000), The Changing Population of China, 
pp. 54–55, Oxford.  
 7  Guo Baochang, et al, »China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth 
Century«, Population and Development Review, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 129–147, March 2007. 
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of local variations, the ›one-child policy‹ remains a core element of China’s fertility 
policy and continues to have an impact on China’s demographic processes8.  
There are shortcomings, in some cases very serious, like other mass program-
mes. China’s family planning programme is heavily reliant on female contraceptive 
methods9. The programme has been promoted for a long time with insufficient sup-
port from other socio-economic institutions. Therefore it has been mainly imple-
mented through government administrative network. The programme required 
couples to reduce the number of children they produce, but was often unable to 
provide adequate social support for people to adjust their strategy for family forma-
tion and necessary compensation for couples to alleviate life risks in the context of 
low fertility. The later task is certainly beyond the capacity of the family planning 
programme. Coercive measures were taken by some local cadres particularly in 
some rural areas in the 1980s, although the government emphasizes on voluntary 
acceptance and opposes coercion in general. The relationship between societal 
interests and individual rights is also an area that needs to be improved.  
The Government has focused its efforts mainly in the rural areas to integrate the 
rural development into the family planning programme. The free election of village-
committees may create a better implementation environment to carry out the family 
planning programme relying mainly on voluntary participation with very limited 
government intervention. The next few years will be crucial in terms of China’s 
population control. 
2. Socio-economic development 
China’s fertility decline was initialised by a strong and effective government-sponso-
red family planning programme. Nevertheless, the socio-economic development is 
certainly another decisive factor facilitating the transition. With the time passing, the 
importance of the socio-economic factors on the fertility trend has been rising10.  
Rapid social changes have occurred since the late 1970s as the economic reform 
commenced. But the speed and the profundity of the reform were much more 
extraordinary after the release of a speech by the top Chinese leader Mr. Deng 
—————— 
 8  Ibid. 
 9  According to government statistics, male methods accounted for only 14.7 and 13.1 pert cent of 
total contraception in 1994 and 1999 respectively.  
 10  For example, Lin Fude and Liu Jinting claimed that during the period between 1982 and 1990, the 
importance of the family planning programme on China’s fertility level decline, while the importance 
of socio-economic factor almost doubled. see Lin Fude and Liu Jinting, ›China’s Fertility Transition 
and the Prospect of Population Situation‹, in Proceedings of the Symposium on Demography of China, 23rd 
IUSSP general Population Conference, Beijing. 
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Xiaoping calling for a fast reform in early 1992. The entire Chinese economy has 
been moving dramatically from a central planned one towards a market economy. 
In accordance to this shift, remarkable changes could be easily seen in almost every 
aspect of society. These changes inevitably mark China’s population dynamics and 
socio-economic development.  
 
Figure 3: Relationship Between Fertility Level and Economic Development 
 
(Sources: Designed by the author) 
 
As the country’s economy is advancing at an unprecedented speed, or even over-
heated, more people are now involved in commercial activities. In the countryside, 
more peasants are preparing to leave their land for cities and other places with 
better economic opportunities. The volume of temporary migration from the rural 
to the urban or between regions, soared in the last few years and reached 140 mil-
lion marks. Some people left their rural homeland for the purpose of avoiding birth 
control regulation, but the overwhelming majority of the migrants move to the 
urban industrial centres seeking for economic opportunities and personal develop-
ment. This is certainly affecting people’s fertility decisions. In urban areas, job secu-
rity for urban residents is facing great challenges, and unemployment becomes an 
every-day phenomenon. Meanwhile, people have got much more freedom to make 
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their own employment and other life decisions. Chinese people are much more 
mobile (both geographically and socially) than ever before. This change greatly 
reduces government’s ability to monitor population dynamics, and the family plan-
ning programme which used to be a community-based (working units or residential 
places) programme is facing serious challenges at present. While people are free 
from the authority of their previous places of work or residence, they are often 
away from benefits they used to be entitled to obtain, such as free reproductive-
health services.11  
Absolute poverty has been gradually alleviated. The number of the impoveri-
shed population reduced from 100 million in the early 1990s down to 40 million by 
the end of 199812 and further down to 26 million in 2005. The Chinese government 
is determined to take more resolute actions to solve food and clothing problems for 
those people living in China’s poverty-stricken areas. Poverty is one of the major 
factors that result in high fertility and resistance to birth control in China’s 
countryside. Poverty eradication, therefore, is certainly to provide relatively better 
working conditions for China’s population programme.  
The education level of Chinese people is fairly low compared to many develo-
ped countries. The illiterate rate for people aged 15 and over remained at 22 per 
cent in 1990 and was reduced to 15 in 2000. There have been improvements along 
with the economic development. For instance, the number of illiterate people aged 
15 to 47 has dropped by 4 million annually since the early 1990s when the number 
was around 35 million13. The illiterate rate for this age group has declined from 10 
per cent in 1990, to 7 per cent in 1995, and below 5 per cent by the end of the 
century14. On the whole, illiteracy is a problem overwhelmingly among the older age 
groups. 90 per cent of illiterate people are peasants, and concentrated mainly in a 
few western provinces. The positive impact of education attainment on fertility 
reduction is well documented by scholars and is also the case for China. It could be 
reasonably expected that further improvement in education is one of the favourable 
factors for China’s future fertility trend.  
With the reform advancing, people’s incomes have increased very rapidly, and 
so is the cost of living, especially the cost of rearing children. Saving for children’s 
—————— 
 11  This is especially the case for millions of female migrants. China’s family planning programme has 
made efforts to handle the issue with various experiments, such as assigning the destination area to 
take the major responsibility for birth control management and contraceptive services.  
 12  Since 1985, China has begun its large-scale poverty alleviation programme. The definition of poverty 
in China is mainly an economic one based on the per capita annual income. The criterion has 
changed over time, from 200 RMB Yuan in 1985, to 300 Yuan in 1991, 400 Yuan in 1994.  
 13  Figures refer to people who are no longer belonging to the illiterate category in a specified year. As a 
certain portion of the group return to illiterate status a few years later, the sum of these figures 
should be used with caution.  
 14  See »China Education Development Plan towards 2010«, Ministry of Education, China, 1996. 
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education has already been the major consideration that determines consumption 
behaviour in China. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening. New social 
stratification is emerging. People are stimulated by the hope of being rich. Under 
this circumstance, to have many children becomes economically irrational and a 
burden to social mobility, which in this case imposes a positive effect on people’s 
acceptance of birth control. On the other hand, however, the desire for more 
children, especially for sons, has come back to some people once they become rich 
as they would like their offspring to continue their business.  
It is too early to draw absolute conclusions regarding the impact of rapid social 
changes at present on China’s population dynamics. While some are beneficial to 
family planning programme, others may be unfavourable. Some changes undermine 
the government capacity to manipulate people’s reproductive behaviour; some 
others could facilitate further fertility reduction. In the long run, socio-economic 
development should make the population control easier. But what will be the case 
in a period of sudden and sharp change, especially with the larger cohort of fertile 
women, remains a crucial question to be answered. Efforts must be, and have alrea-
dy been, made to rethink the strategy of China’s family planning programme in 
order to adapt to the changing situation.  
3. Changes in family and reproductive culture 
In the traditional Chinese society, the family was the soul or the basic cell. The 
whole nation, the government and the entire society was based on the family 
structure. Such a culture has gradually changed, and the society is undergoing a very 
rapid transformation. 
The major features of marriage patterns in recent decades for China as a whole 
can be summarised in four main points.  
(1)  The Chinese pattern of universality of first marriage has evidently been conti-
nued.  
(2)  The age at first marriage increased dramatically in the 1970s, but decreased in 
the 1980s with a modest scale, and increased again since the early 1990s.  
(3)  In terms of the timing of the first marriage, there are significant differences 
among Chinese cities, towns and rural areas.  
(4)  The first marriage of Chinese women has been concentrated in a rather narrow 
age interval. (Zeng 2000) 
However, some radical changes in nuptiality have already emerged, especially in big 
cities like Shanghai. The proportion of unmarried women in their early 30s increa-
sed sharply in recent years in Shanghai, particularly among white-collar employees. 
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According to fragmental information, about 3 per cent of the women aged 30 
remained single in 1997, while the figure was less than 1 per cent in the 1980s. The 
interval between marriage and the first childbearing increased from 1 year to near 
2.5 years, as more young couples would like to spend longer years without the 
burden of childbearing. The number of voluntary childless couples has also been 
rising in the recent years. The rising of premarital cohabitation comes along with 
these changes15. On the whole, people in Chinese cities are taking a much more 
tolerant attitude towards marriage and sex activities, although the traditional ethic 
remains strong. This trend would continue and expand to other regions and social 
groups as well.  
The population statistics show that the average size of a family household is 
about 3.39 persons at present, a decline of 1.42 persons over the last three decades 
and compared to the sizes of 4.43 in 1982 and 4.05 in 1990. The number of 
children per household decreased from 1.49 in 1982 to 1.12 in 1990, 97 per cent of 
which could be attributed to the reduction in births. The nuclear family has taken an 
important place, and this pattern is gradually expanding in society. However, the 
stem family holds as the leading pattern in society and most of the elderly still live 
with their adult children. The intra-family relationship has been changing to be 
much more equal between generations, while the traditional pattern of parent domi-
nation, especially in terms of marriage and childbearing, is gradually given away. 
This provides much more autonomy for the young couples to make their own 
reproductive decisions with less intervention from their parents than there used to 
be.  
The Change in marriage and family patterns is partly brought about by the past 
fertility transition. Meanwhile, it also affects the fertility desire and behaviour of the 
young generation. Based on survey reports, the average desired family size (the 
number of children) varied narrowly between 1.6–2.5 over time and across regions. 
It means that a large family is no longer the desire of Chinese people. Some may 
argue that many of these replies from the interviewees were biased by the policy 
enforcement. Nevertheless, one can be sure that ›two children per family‹ has been 
the widely desired family size regardless of rural-urban stratification. The Chinese 
family has already become very small – on average it is about 1.7 children per family – 
but in the urban area the figure is even lower standing at slightly more than 1 child 
per family. In Shanghai it is only 0.8 children per family.  
The dynamic is multidirectional. On the one hand there has been a roll-back to 
traditional family forms and family norms in the recent years. On the other hand 
there is a tendency towards diversified family forms and social norms, such as 
—————— 
 15  Unfortunately, there are no solid data on the afore mentioned new phenomenon. But interested 
readers could find many TV series, novels, and other media materials touching on this issue.  
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single-parent families and DINK families. This is particularly true as millions of 
»single child« reach the age of marriage and childbearing. The younger generation 
nowadays has become much more mobile and independent. This creates a lot of 
problems in terms of the parents-children relations and the socialisation of a single 
child. Also linked to this issue are future family functions, family relations and 
family structures. While the sex activity was strictly refrained within marriage in the 
traditional Chinese society, one has gradually been disconnected from the other. 
While changes in family patterns and public views on the family are results of 
China’s family planning programme and fertility transition over the past several 
decades, they have also created favourable social conditions for the sustainability of 
China’s fertility transition.  
4. Gender equality and Women’s Status 
Since the 1950s, Chinese women’s societal role has been transformed considerably, 
and the saying »women hold up half the sky« has been taken seriously. The pursuit 
of gender equality has been regarded by the State as one of its central political goals. 
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that »women enjoy 
equal rights with men in all spheres of life, political, economic, cultural and social, 
including family life«. In addition to that, the Marriage Law, the Inheritance Act, the 
Electoral Law, the Criminal Law, the Compulsory Education Law etc. have also 
made detailed stipulations on women’s relevant rights and worked out measures for 
the protection of those rights. In April 1992, China’s National People’s Congress 
adopted the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests which consis-
ted of 9 sections and 54 articles. This law provides a comprehensive guideline to 
and protection of Chinese women’s legal rights with regards to political and social 
life, culture and education, work, property, marriage and family and so on. The Law 
was modified recently to adapt to the new situation in China.  
There are not only the laws and regulations which protect women’s basic rights, 
but also many social and economic measures that are particularly made for the pur-
pose of gender equality. Consequently, women’s status in China, especially in urban 
China, is high by international standards (Greenhalgh 1991). Chinese women are 
better off, in terms of health, labour force and political participation, than women in 
many other developing countries. There are, nevertheless, large regional and rural-
urban differences. Even within the urban areas, there exists a marked difference 
between women who hold permanent urban registry and those who do not.  
In comparison to their rural counterparts, women that hold permanent urban 
registry enjoy much more privileges. Most of them are covered by the social security 
system, receiving government subsidies or welfare provision for housing, medicare 
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and other maternal benefits. Their economic participation was secured by the 
government during the rapid fertility decline before the 1990s. On the other hand, 
women who migrated to urban areas and have not received their urban registry are 
in a quite different situation.  
As China is rapidly transforming from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy, many new issues have been emerging for both of these two groups of 
women, but the problems that they face remain quite different. For ›native‹ urban 
women, many privileges that they used to enjoy are now in question. For migrant 
women, the priorities are survival and adaptation to urban environments, rather 
than advancement.  
There are always contradictions between women’s production and reproduction 
responsibilities. Although both work and motherhood are considered important 
roles for Chinese women, popular attitude tends to favour the latter role as being 
the primary one (Peng 1989). Before the 1980s, this contradiction was largely resol-
ved by government intervention, and the production cost entailed by the women’s 
reproductive role was basically borne by the State, or the entire society. Women’s 
freedom to work was materialized in a mechanism of ›big iron bowl‹.  
There has been substantial equality in labour force participation between the 
two sexes, even though sex differentials persist. This holds true particularly when 
China is compared with other Asian countries (Ogawa/Saito 1987). In theory, wo-
men workers receive the same wages as their male colleagues in the same position. 
However, the opportunity for job promotion and occupational structure for men 
and women are quite different. The average income of urban female labour is 
around 70 per cent of their male counterparts, which is mainly caused by different 
retirement arrangement and job segregation16.  
The incompatibility between women’s productive and reproductive roles has 
become more serious with the progress of the economic reform in China and the 
establishment of a market economy in which efficiency rather than equality is 
becoming the major concern of society. 
The reform of the labour market, especially the restructuring of large state-
owned companies has been carried out widely. The general purpose of this measure 
is to improve efficiency and reduce deficits. As a result of the move, a relatively 
large proportion of unfit workers are transferred, either towards staying at home 
waiting for jobs or towards other economic activities which require less training and 
skill. As the entire labour force faces this challenge, women workers are in a much 
more vulnerable situation. The number of unemployed women has increased 
substantially, and they are threatened by unemployment more often than their male 
counterparts. 
—————— 
 16  The legal retirement age is 55 years for women and 60 years for men.  
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This continuous fertility decline greatly reduces the childbearing burden on urban 
women, prolongs women’s potential working life, and reduces the risk of maternal 
mortality. However, the responsibility for population control has been taken over 
mainly by Chinese women, while men contribute very little and have made very 
limited efforts in this regard, which can be seen from the pattern of contraceptive-
use.  
China’s family planning programme is heavily reliant on female contraceptive 
methods. By promoting the use of IUDs and female sterilization as preferred 
methods of contraception, the burden for achieving China’s demographic goals has 
been disproportionately placed on Chinese women. This obviously adds to wo-
men’s reproductive duties, meanwhile reducing their ability for production.  
At present, an overwhelming majority of urban retired people are entitled to old 
age pensions provided mainly by the State. Public provision of social security has 
been established, but the coverage is very limited. Consequently, family support is 
very much encouraged by Chinese culture and the government. In other words, the 
Chinese family remains a basic source of old age support, especially in terms of care 
and service. Most adult offsrpings would like to take good care of their senior 
parents or parents-in-law, but they often have to make a choice between the sup-
port of the elderly and the pursuit of their own career. Moreover, the responsibility 
of family support for the elderly lies, and will be more likely to continue lying, on 
the shoulders of women. Survey reports indicate that while elderly women depend 
more on daughters and/or daughters-in-law, elderly men mainly depend on their 
spouses for daily care. This increasing burden for family care of the elderly may 
offset what urban women gain from the fertility transition, and may jeopardize their 
careers outside the family. While women have more freedom to participate in the 
social and economic activities of society due to the shortened period for childbea-
ring as a consequence of the rapid fertility decline, family support for the elderly 
may draw women back home. Very little attention has been devoted to this issue so 
far.  
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
In December 2006, the Chinese government issued a directive to reaffirm its com-
mitment to population control, which was a follow-up to the similar government 
statement in 200017. It also indicates that the present population policy will be main-
tained in effect for the coming years, allowing some minor modification. In this 
—————— 
 17  »Decision on Strengthening Population and Family Planning Work, Maintaining low Fertility«, 
Directive issued by CCCP and the State Council, 2nd March 2000. 
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context, together with the findings from earlier sections of the paper, the govern-
ment population policy will decide the basic level of China’s fertility, at least for the 
early 21st century. The deviation from this line will be determined jointly by the abi-
lity of the government to implement its policy and programme, the impact of 
development in China’s social, economic and political reform, and people’s general 
desire for family size. Meanwhile, people’s volunteer participation and free determi-
nation will play much more important roles in determining the future fertility level 
in China.  
The transformation of government organisations and functions is under way. 
The basic idea is to make the government focus on certain important issues, and 
society will take care of the remaining things, or so-called ›small government and big 
social services‹ in Chinese. The government system is undergoing a profound 
restructuring process. This change may not directly affect the quality of 
contraceptive service, but may make it more difficult now to keep people working 
for the family planning programmes as job security reduces. Together with other 
administrative restructuring measures, this shakes the foundation of China’s current 
family planning programme since it has been largely depended on an effective 
administrative system. Another development in the political field is the direct 
election of the village management committee that is responsible for the daily 
operation of China’s Population programme. The election itself would reduce the 
occurrence of coercion and increase the volunteer participation.  
There are concerns about the vulnerability of China’s fertility transition and the 
possibility of fertility rebound if the government, either voluntarily or forced to, 
loses control on population issues. On the other hand, the optimistic view takes 
into account the determination and capacity of the government in carrying out 
family planning plus the significant impact on people’s reproductive behaviour of 
the fundamental changes that have occurred in China’s society and economy since 
the opening and reform. 
At the launch of the One-Child-Policy, the intention was made clear that this 
should be a policy measure for a period of only 20 to 30 years.18 After more than 20 
years of implementation, it has met its primary objective to slow down China’s 
population growth. On the other hand, there are also profound socio-economic and 
demographic consequences. Current policy debates have concentrated on these 
issues, including rapid process of population aging, abnormal sex ratio at birth, and 
reproductive health etc.  
—————— 
 18  See Guanyu kongzhi woguo renkou zengzhang wenti zhi quanti gongchan dangyuan, gongqing tuanyuan de 
gongkaixin (An Open Letter to All Members of the Communist Party and Communist Youth 
League), Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 25th Sep. 1980. 
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China is perhaps the first major country to become old before it becomes rich. 
Although China is now ranking number four in terms of the total GPD in the 
world, per capita GPD in China is only less than 2000 US Dollars. In that sense 
China is still a large developing country. On the other hand, all aging indicators 
show that China has already entered the stage of population aging and the process is 
accelerating in a much more rapid speed. The aging in China is much earlier than 
many developed countries, or compared with India, Brazil or other major develo-
ping countries. Chinese society and the family will have to adapt to this changed 
situation.  
Despite all the shortcomings, China’s family planning programme has been 
supported at large by the public. On the whole, it has brought about dramatic chan-
ges in people’s fertility behaviour in a relatively short period of time, and 
successfully slowed down the rapid population growth in China, which also has 
profound impact on the stabilisation of the world population. The deepened 
involvement of China in the globalisation of world economy may further facilitate the 
introduction of new and more effective birth control methods. There have always 
been gaps between the targets of the programme and its public acceptance, but the 
gaps have been reduced with the time passing. The norm of having a small family 
has been widely accepted by the public, especially in those advanced regions and 
among the »single-child« generation. The reproductive behaviour of that generation 
will determine the future fertility level for China in the 21st Century. 
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